Boethius wrote several books.
The Latin word persona was originally used to denote the mask worn by an actor. From this it was applied to the role he assumed, and, finally, to any character on the stage of life, to any individual. This article discusses 1 the definition of "person", especially with reference to the doctrine of the Incarnation; and 2 the use of the word persona and its Greek equivalents in connection with the Trinitarian disputes.
Definition The classic definition is that given by Boethius in "De persona et duabus naturis", c. Substantia -- "Substance" is used to exclude accidents: Substantia is used in two senses: It is disputed which of the two the word taken by itself here signifies.
It seems probable that of itself it prescinds from substantia prima and substantia secunda, and is restricted to the former signification only by the word individua.
Boethius in giving his definition does not seem to attach any further signification to the word.
It is merely synonymous with singularis. Rationalis naturae -- Person is predicated only of intellectual beings. The generic word which includes all individual existing substances is suppositum.
Thus person is a subdivision of suppositum which is applied equally to rational and irrational, living and non-living individuals. A person is therefore sometimes defined as suppositum naturae rationalis.
The definition of Boethius as it stands can hardly be considered a satisfactory one. The words taken literally can be applied to the rational soul of man, and also the human nature of Christ.
Thomas accepts it is presumably due to the fact that he found it in possession, and recognized as the traditional definition. He explains it in terms that practically constitute a new definition. Individua substantia signifies, he says, substantia, completa, per se subsistens, separata ab aliia, i.
If to this be added rationalis naturae, we have a definition comprising the five notes that go to make up a person: To a person therefore belongs a threefold incommunicability, expressed in notes bcand d.
The human soul belongs to the nature as a part of it, and is therefore not a person, even when existing separately. The human nature of Christ does not exist per se seorsum, but in alio, in the Divine Personality of the Word.
It is therefore communicated by assumption and so is not a person. Lastly the Divine Essence, though subsisting per se, is so communicated to the Three Persons that it does not exist apart from them; it is therefore not a person. Theologians agree that in the Hypostatic Union the immediate reason why the Sacred Humanity, though complete and individual, is not a person is that it is not a subsistence, not per se seorsum subsistens.
They have, however, disputed for centuries as to what may be the ultimate determination of the nature which if present would make it a subsistence and so a person, what in other words is the ultimate foundation of personality.
According to Scotusas he is usually understood, the ultimate foundation is a mere negation. That individual intellectual nature is a person which is neither of its nature destined to be communicated--as is the human soul --nor is actually communicated--as is the Sacred Humanity.
If the Hypostatic Union ceased, the latter would ipso facto, without any further determination, become a person. To this it is objected that the person possesses the nature and all its attributes.
It is difficult to believe that this possessor, as distinct from the objects possessed, is constituted only by a negative. Consequently, the traditional Thomistsfollowing Cajetan, hold that there is a positive determination which they call the "mode" of subsistence.
It is the function of this mode to make the nature incommunicable, terminated in itself, and capable of receiving its own esse, or existence. Without this mode the human nature of Christ exists only by the uncreated esse of the Word.Boethius teaching his students (initial in a Italian manuscript of the Consolation of Philosophy.).
Concerning his distinction between»providence«and»fate«, this essay reconsiders and modi;es the view of some modern readers, according to which Boethius's account entirely depends on Proclus.
Severinus Boethius, Trost der Philosophie Vermächtnis Und Verhängnis Eines Philosophen. Richard Lösch - Boethius in Medieval and. What did Boethius write? SAVE ' 'Boethian number theory' 'King Alfred's Old English version of Boethius De consolatione philosophiae' 'Trost der Philosophie' 'The consolation of philosophy of.
Schrimpf, G., , Die Axiomenschrift des Boethius (De Hebdomadibus) als philosophisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters, Leiden: Brill (Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 2). Free Essay: Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy In the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius addresses many solutions to the never-ending problem of evil.
In. The Consolations of Philosophy, Alain de Botton The Consolations of Philosophy is a nonfiction book by Alain de Botton. First published by Hamish Hamilton in /5.