President Abraham Lincoln Lt. Robert Bowman, PhD, U. There's a second group of facts having to do with the cover up.
War and Sacrifice in Kosovo Paul W. Kahn The most striking ethical issue to arise in the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention is whether the extraordinary asymmetry of risk that characterized the NATO deployment -- NATO forces were destroying and killing without themselves suffering losses -- is morally defensible.
The appearance of riskless war is profoundly disturbing to many, not because they believe it to be inherently wrong, but because they do not know how to think about it at all. Our moral intuitions were formed when war was a confrontation of armies on a battlefield; these intuitions may no longer be reliable sources for evaluating military conduct.
Was mutual risk simply an unavoidable fact of war in the past or is mutual risk a morally compelling requirement of a just war? While the military deployment was still under way, questions about the morality of a policy of riskless warfare were framed in terms of its tactical consequences.
The policy meant, for example, that the use of ground troops was ruled out. Many critics believed that without ground troops, or at least a credible threat of their use, an air campaign could not succeed.
Others argued that an air campaign conducted with pilot safety as the first concern would at worst hit unintended targets, and at best take such a long time to be effective that the Serbs would have ample opportunity to accomplish their policy of ethnic cleansing.
At this point, it is hard to know how effective the air campaign was on its own terms, how much the outcome of the war turned on diplomacy -- particularly Russian pressure on the Serbs -- or how critical was the decision to extend the air campaign to civilian targets in Serbia proper especially the electrical grid.
It is hard to believe, for example, that NATO could have mounted a ground campaign more quickly, that such a campaign would have caused less collateral damage, or that it would have led to a military outcome more advantageous than the withdrawal of the Serbian army and the return of refugees that we have seen.
The question of the morality of riskless warfare, however, persists quite independently of the debate over tactics. Indeed, the moral puzzle of riskless warfare is oddly proportional to the success of the intervention.
If the intervention had not been successful, it would be easy to agree with the critics that the failure to assume risks was a failure to adopt military means commensurate with the morally compelling task of preventing atrocity.
The real puzzle is why we should continue to have any qualms even if the military intervention is judged to be a success. A Matter of Chivalry? Every state wants to minimize its own losses when it commits itself to the use of force.
There is nothing new in this.
NATO policy, however, seems to have crossed from a goal of minimizing losses to a qualitatively different goal of no losses at all. That the war lasted for several months, and included some 35, sorties, without the loss of a single NATO serviceman from hostile activity tells us that this ambition may have become reality.
That riskless warfare even raises a moral puzzle may seem, at first, no more than a lingering cultural remnant of a world in which battle was governed by rules of chivalry -- a romantic ideal that has been out of touch with actual combat for most of this century.
Conventional warfare has become a confrontation of mechanical means, in which combatants rarely see directly the targets of their actions. It is no longer far-fetched to imagine military conflicts waged by small groups of high-tech warriors who select targets, push buttons, and are home for dinner.
Though some commentators object to the "sanitizing" of war -- leading, they warn, to moral callousness and a disregard for humanitarian norms -- their worries may seem like vestiges of an ethos that has been decisively displaced. Recent experience suggests, moreover, that personal confrontation may itself exacerbate a tendency toward atrocity.
Within Kosovo, a war was waged at the direct, person-to-person level: But it was hardly the case that chivalry retained a place in this context -- just the opposite.
The worst examples we have of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the past decade -- Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo -- all share the element of direct personal confrontation between the violator and his victim. This double failure of the chivalrous ideal reflects a deeper moral asymmetry in the conduct of war today.
One hundred years ago, war was still considered a legal means of contesting or advancing the interests of the state. That meant that each party to a conflict could confront the other on morally neutral terms. If war was "politics by other means," then there was no necessity that combatants view their opponents as the enemies of mankind or as tainted by the immorality of their ends.
A morally neutral battlefield also meant that third parties did not have to take sides. Today, the international use of force is prohibited under the United Nations Charter. Increasingly, this prohibition on the use of force is thought to apply to many internal conflicts as well.
We do not approach these military conflicts from the perspective of neutrality, but rather with the understanding that there is a legal and illegal, a good and bad.
Chivalry lacks a foundation in such a moral universe, because it suggests that a code of personal honor may link combatants to each other over and above the difference in the ends for which they fight. Today, illegal wars tend to be fought by illegal means.
Earlier in this century, the opposite concern seemed no less urgent: The refusal to accept such a risk led, for example, to the threat to use weapons of mass destruction rather than accept defeat.
In all of this, the importance of the end -- whether legal or illegal -- seems to overwhelm the legal regulation of the means.Moral Accountability Limited Time Offer at Lots of schwenkreis.com!!! We have made a special deal with a well known Professional Research Paper company to offer you up to 15 professional research papers per month for just $ Hard scientific evidence that 9/11 was an inside job.
World Trade Center towers destroyed by controlled demolitions using Nano-thermite - investigate Thermate Superthermite Red Thermite chips found. War and Sacrifice in Kosovo Nevertheless, there remains something disturbing in the picture of the United States responding to the next Kosovo by simply sending in cruise missiles to hit targets selected through satellite surveillance.
Morality in the Message. This website provides responsible criticism of the 9/11 Commission Report by senior military, intelligence and government officials. It provides experienced professional opinions about the terrorist attacks on the world trade center and the pentagon.
HollaWho United States of America 25 points 26 points 27 points 3 months ago (56 children) The US military loves to make a public show of force in these types of situations.
I don't think it's the US. Television Wars (Crossing a Line in Serbia) two cruise missiles struck the Radio Televizija Srbija (SRT) headquarters in Belgrade. “Whatever the explanation, one can see United States.